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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRED 0. WOLD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-v~.-
OGDEN CITY, a :Municipal Corpora-
tion, and WHEELWRIGHT CON-
STRUCTION CO~IP ANY OF 
OGDEN, UTAH, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 7927 
This is an appeal from an order dismissing the plain-
tiff's cause of action with prejudice made upon motion 
of respondents at the close of appellant's opening state-
ment. 
Appellant's case came on for trial on the 2nd day of 
October, 1952, and after the opening statement, motions 
were made by both respondents for dismissal. From 
the pleadings and the ·opening statement it appears that 
the following are the facts upon which the order of the 
court was entered. 
On June 26, 1951, at 12:30 o'clock A.M., appellant 
drove his automobile eastward along 18th Street in the 
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City of Ogden; that at a point just east of where Kiesel 
A venue enters 18th Street plaintiff stopped, parked the 
automobile and attempted to cross from a point where 
Kiesel A venue enters 18th Street to his home located at 
336 18th Stre·et. Appellant was accompanied by his wife. 
During lthe day of the 25th of June respondent, 
Wheelwright Construction Company, had dug a trench 
in an easterly-westerly direction, which was 4¥2 feet 
deep and betwe·en 2 and 2¥2 feet wide. The trench ex-
tended from Grant A venue to Washington A venue, and 
was along the northern edge of 18th Street. The dirt, 
which was removed from the trench, had been piled on 
the south side of it. The trench was being dug by the 
construction company on behalf of the respondent, Ogden 
City, and with the permission of Ogden City. Exhibit 
"A" accurately reflects the condition of the trench as it 
was at the time appellant was injured, with the exception 
of the covering appearing in the foreground of the pic-
ture. No covering was in place on the morning of .Tune 
26th. The trench had been dug while appellant was at 
work during the day of June 25th Appellant had had 
no opportunity to examine it in the daylight prior to 
his injury. 
There were no lights along the trench, either street 
lights or Ian terns ; there were no openings constructed 
through the bank of dirt, and no bridges or other cover-
ings over the trench for persons to use in crossing from 
the street onto the sidewalk. 
On the day of the 25th of June l\ir. 1\filler, in whose 
home appellant resided, had requested the Wheelwright 
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Construction Cmnpany, as they were constructing the 
trench, to provide a n1eans for crossing over the trench 
and bank of dirt at a point where his driveway inter-
sected 18th Street. This was not done. A flat refusal 
was accorded ~Ir. Miller's request. 
The picture, Exhibit ''A," shows the bridge con-
structed by ~Ir. :fililler at a later time over the trench 
and is at a point where his driveway intersects 18th 
Street. The driveway is also directly acros~ from the 
point where the sidewalk at Kiesel A venue intersect:J 
18th Street. 
During the opening statement of counsel a rough 
sketch was used and a picture of the sketch is attached 
and made a part of the record, being a blue page with a 
photograph attached to it. That photograph shows Kiesel 
Avenue and is the area marked with an "S," which indi-
cates a southerly direction. 
At no place along 18th Street had there been pro-
vided any way for pedestrians to cross over the bank of 
dirt or the trench. The trees along 18th Street, in the 
vicinity of 336, are large· and provide a dense shade on 
the sidewalk (See Exhibit "A"). 
On lthe morn_ing of the 26th appellant, having stopped 
his automobile immediately to the east of the point where 
Kiesel A venue intersects 18th Street, walked across 18th 
Street and inspected the trench and the bank of dirt, 
climbed over the bank of dirt and decided that he could 
safely cross the trench and enter his home at 336 18th 
Street. To do this he placed one foot on the southern 
edge of the trench and the other across on the northe-rn 
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edge of the trench. It was his intention to stand in that 
position and assist his wife across the trench. Appellant 
was straddling the trench facing east. While in that posi-
tion the south bank of the trench collapsed under his foot 
and he fell into the trench, striking the left side of his 
body against the bank of the trench. The fall fractured 
two of his ribs which necessitated loss of approximately 
ten weeks f_rom his work and resulted in appellant incur-
ring considerable medical expense. 
The neighbors commonly crossed over the trench 
in going from the street to their homes along 18th Street, 
both in the daytime and in the nighttime (Tr. 6). 
The basis of the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint 
was that appellant was ·contributorily negligent as 
1natter of law in attempting to cross the trench and enter 
his residence from 18th Street. 
STATEMENT OF POINT 
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S CAUSE DEPRIVES HIM 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL. HE 
WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS MATTER 
OF LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S CAUSE DEPRIVES HIM 
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF JURY TRIAL. HE 
WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT AS MATTER 
OF LAW. 
This Court, in one of its 1nost recent caseR, has 
clearly pronounced the rule which is applicable and which 
is calculated to preserve for litigants their constitutional 
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right of trial by jury. This Court stated t~lat only in 
very clear cases should a trial judge direct a verdict 
against plaintiff on the grounds that plaintiff was 
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. 
Stickle r. Union Pacific Railroacl f'l a., ----~- Utah ______ , _____ _ 
P. 2d ------· Justice Crockett, in elucidating the right, fur-
ther wrote: 
··In our democratic syste1n, the people are the 
repository of power whence the law is derived; 
fr01n its initiation and ·creation to its final ~tpplica­
tion and enforcen1ent, the law is the expression 
of their \Yill. The functioning of a cross-section 
of the citizenry as a jun~ is the Inethod by which 
the people express this will in the application of 
la-\v to controversies which arise under it. Both 
our constitutional and statutory provisions assure 
trial by jury to citizens of this state. 
"Courts, as final arbiters of law, could arro-
gate to themselves arbitrary and dangerous 
powers by presuming to hold to them::;elves and 
determine questions a.f fact which litigants have a 
right to have passed upon by juries. Part of the 
merit of the jury system is its safeguarding 
against such arbitrary power in the courts. To 
the great credit of the courts of this country, 
they have been extremely reluctant to infringe up-
on this right, and by leaving it unimpaired have 
kep:t the administration of justice close to the 
people. Of course, the rights of litigants should 
not be surrendered to the arbitrary will of juries 
without regard to whether there is a violation of 
legal rights as a basis for recovery. The court 
does have a duty and a responsibility of super-
visorY control over the action of juries which is 
just ·as essential to the proper administration 
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of justice as the jury itself. Nevertheless, we re-
rnain cognizant of the vital ilnportance of the 
privilege of trial by jury in our system of justice 
and deP;rn it our duty to zealously protect and pre-
serve it." 
Reasonable men may differ as to the reasonable-
ness of the course appellant pursued on the early morn-
ing of the 26th of June, 1951 in crossing 18th Street to 
enter his home. Some such men may think that he should 
have walked a block at that late hour of the night in order 
to avoid the necessity of stepping across the trench. Some 
such men we insist would have thought his course of con-
duct, under all the circumstances, reasonable and such as 
they themselves might have taken. This disagreement 
between reasonable persons makes the conduct of appel-
lant a question of fact. The fact that it is close and that 
reasonable men may differ in judgment of appellant's 
conduct is one of the mos\t salient reasons why the jury 
should consider and pass upon appellant's cause. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Bailey 
v. Central Ve'fmont Ry., Inc., 319 U.S. 350, 63'S. Ct. 1062, 
1064, discusses the right of trial by jury and the rights 
of plaintiffs to have the jury apply to their conduct the 
standard of reasonableness. Mr. Justice Douglas, in dis-
cussing the conduct of Bailey, made the following state-
ment which seems especially pertinent in the present 
case: 
"The nature of the task which Bailey under-
took, the hazards which it entailed, the effort 
which it required, the kind of footing he had, th9 
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space in which he could stand, the absence of a 
guard rail, the height of the bridge above the 
ground, the fact that the car could have been open-
ed or unloaded near the bridge on level ground-
all these were facts and circumstances for the jury 
to weigh and appraise in determining whether 
respondent in furnishing Bailey with that particu-
lar place in which to perform the task was negli-
gent. The debatable quality of that issue, the fact 
that fair-minded men might reach different con-
clusions, emphasize the appropriateness of leaving 
the question to the jury. The jury is the tribunal 
under our legal system to decide that type of issue 
(Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line H. Co., supra) as 
well as issues involving controverted evidence. 
Jones v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co., 128 U.S. 
443, 445, 9 S. Ct. 118, 32 L. Ed. 4 78; Washington 
& G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 572, 10 8. Ct. 
1044, 1049, 34 L. Ed. 235. To withdraw such a 
question from the jury is to usurp its functions." 
The application of the reasonable man standard is 
the job which the jury must be allowed to perform. A 
judicial application of the standard must ·of necessity 
decide factual ques1tions. First, the judge must decide 
the facts and circumstances confronting appellant. Sec-
ond, he must apply to that factual situation factual stand-
ards and adjudge that the conduct of appellant was not 
the conduct of a reasonable man. All of these functions 
are the job of the jury. 
We have presented by the facts of this appeal a 
situation of appellant exposing himself to a known dan-
ger in order to exercise the right and privilege which 
he has to use the highways and streets of Ogden City and 
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to cross from said streets into his place of residence. 
Under such circumstances the mere fact that there is an 
exposure to danger and risk of bodily harm does not as 
matter of law 1nake appellant guilty of contributory 
negligence. It is only when the risk of bodily harm is 
unreasonable or, to put it another way, when such risk 
is greater than a reasonable man would take that appel 
lant's conduct becomes negligent and bars him from re-
covering against the respondents. A.L.I. Restatement 
of the Law of Torts, Vol. II, p. 1243, Sec. 473. 
The factual situation involves a number of factual 
considerations. For instance, a comparison between the 
right 'to be exercised and the risk to be encountered is of 
prin1ary ilnportance. Also to be considered is the incon-
venience of alt.e·rnative methods of exercising the right 
or privilege. It could be conceded that there is a point 
when use of the streets and sidewalks will become so 
dangerous that an individual entitled to use streets and 
sidewalks should not use them but should seek an alter-
native route if one exists. If no alternative exists he 
would still be entitled to use the· streets regardless of 
the risk of injury. 
There appears to be a sliding scale. The less conven-
ient and more circuitous the alternative route becomes 
the greater the dangers may be to which a reasonable 
man would expose himself. The purpose for which appel-
lant was using the highway, the time of day, alter-
native route, dangers involved, and convenience to appel-
lant's wife accompanying him, are all factual matter.:; 
surrounding the occurrence which mu:.;t be resolved to 
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decide whether or not appellant's conduct \vas negligent. 
Stating the proposition another way, whether or not ap-
pellant's action is reasonable always depends on whether 
or not the advantage to be gained by using the street 
in its dangerous condition is or is not sufficient to justify 
the danger involved in its use. A.L.I. Restatement of the 
Lmc of Torts, Yol. II, p. 12±3, Sec. 473. 
A person whose access to a residence is obstructed 
by negligent maintenance of a public street, is justified 
in taking a greater risk to enter or leave his home than 
a traveler would take merely to use the highway for an 
ordinary purpose of travel. Only when the risk is so 
great that injury is unavoidable would a reasonable man 
forego the exercise of this right. 
Whether or not conduct is contributory negligence 
must depend upon the circumstances of each particular 
case. The application of the reasonable man standard 
it is submitted is the function assigned to the jury and 
in the present case that function has been usurped by 
the judge, and appellant has been deprived of his right 
to a jury trial. 
The jury must itself define the standard of a reason-
able man and then apply that standard to the conduct of 
the appellant. Both of these functions are factual in their 
nature and the court by performing them deprives appel-
lant of his constitutional right of trial by jury. 
There can be no dispute about one particular applic-
able principle. Appellant had a right to use the public 
streets and sidewalks from side to side and this right 
would, of course, increase the amount of risk which he, 
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as a reasonable man, could take in the exercise of his 
right. 
In Stringham et al. v. Salt Lake City, 114 Utah 517 
201 P. 2d 758, 762, this Court, in establishing for the citi-
zens of the State of Utah their right to use the publie 
streets and sidewalks, stated as follows: 
"However, in detennining this question it is 
necessary to examine the fundamental ideas un-
derlying the use of public streets. Streets from 
side to side, including the sidewalks and all area 
between are primarily for the public use. The 
public use is paramount. As stated in McQuillan .. 
1\;f unici pal Corporations, 2nd Ed., Vol. 3, Sec. 981, 
at page 217: 
'' '* * * In the control of streets and 
public ways the municipality is a trustee for 
the entire public, and as such trustee it should 
permit nothing Ito be done that will interfere 
with the condition of the streets or their free 
use by all alike * * * .' 
"The interest of the public in the streets is char-
acterized in the case of Thompson v. Smith, 155 
Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 583, 71 A.L.R. 604, as fol-
lows: 
"Use of streets for ordinary purposes of life 
is a right. 'It is not a mere privilege, like the 
privilege of moving a house in the street, operat-
ing a business stand in the street, or transporting 
persons or ptoperty for hire along the street, 
which a city may permit or prohibit at will.' 
(Italics added.) 
"Similar pronouncements may be found in: 
:JlcGuire v. \Vilkerson, 22 Old. Cr. 36, 209 P. -l-!5; 
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\Vood v. City of Chickasha, 125 Old. 212, 257 P. 
:286; Child v. Bemus, 17 R. I. 230, 21 A. 539, 12 
L.R .• -\. 57; Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 
131 Minn. 195, 154 N:\V. 964, L.R.A. 1916C, 224; 
and many others." 
.Applications of law to a number of fact situations 
more or less similar to the present case have been dis-
covered by appellant. These cases show a steadfast 
protection of the right of trial by jury in cases similar to 
the case at bar. One of the cases most similar in fact is 
Alarid, et al. L'. Gordon, et al., 35 N.M. 502, 2 P. 2d 117. 
There plaintiff, walking along a city street, feU into an 
open lateral which had been excavated in the construction 
of a sewer. The trial court found generally in favor of 
the plaintiff, awarding her damages for the injuries which 
she suffered. The defendant appealed, the basic grounds 
being that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence as a matter of law, stating that it appe·ared from 
the undisputed evidence that the plaintiff entered upon 
a dangerous place and atte·mpted to pass through and 
over said dangerous place wi'th full knowledge of the 
fact that public improvements were being made ; that she 
might have chosen a safe route which would not have 
taken her out of her w:ay more than a few minutes at 
most, and elected to take th~ dangerous route instead of 
the safe route and was guilty of contributory negligence 
which was the primary cause of her accident. The court 
rejects the proposition and states that after plaintiff had 
chosen her route from her home she discovered the ex-
istence of the laterals; i:hat to turn back on her chosen 
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route at that ti1ne would have been unnatural and there 
was a question of fact whether or not an ordinary pru-
dent person would have proceeded along the route after 
discovery of the lateral construction. The court had no 
trouble whatsoever in finding that the leaving of open 
laterals unlighted, without a watchman or a barricade 
was negligence on the part of the contractor. 
A case very close on the facts wherein a bank on 
which plaintiff was standing caved, precipitating her 
into a hole, is Tait v. Kirng County, 85 Wash. 491, 148 Pac. 
586,. 589. In discussing the question of whether or not 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a 
matter of law, the court sets- out the pe-rtinent facts and 
states as foHows: 
"The next question is whether the appellant 
was guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter 
of law. The evidence shows that she knew the con-
dition of Beach Drive, and of the particular hole 
into which she fell, for some months prior to the 
accident; that she had frequently traveled over 
the street; that she had a lantern at home, but 
did not take it with her upon this particular occa-
sion; that at the time of the accident she was ad-
vised by her daughter and knew they were closely 
approaching the hole into which she fell. The evi-
dence does not show, however, that she had an~· 
knowledge that the subsoil or undersoil was wash-
ed away so as to leave the upper and hard surface 
in the form of a projecting ledge. 'She did not step 
into the hole, but, while standing near the edge 
thereof, the ground upon which she was standing 
gave way under her feet. The law does not in all 
cases hold a person, injured by a defect in a high-
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way, g·uilty of contributory negligence merely be-
cause such person may have had previous knowl-
edge of the defect, but generally treats the, matter 
of knowledge as a fact or circumstance bearing up-
on the question of contributory negligence to be 
subn1itted to the jury along with all the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the accident, leaving it 
for them to determine whether, under the facts 
shown, the injured person was or was not guilty of 
contributory negligence. Blankenship v. l{ing 
County, 68 \Yash. 84, 122 Pac. 616, 40 L.R.A. 
(N.S.) 182. But in this case, as already mentioned, 
while the plaintiff had the knowledge of the hole, 
it was not shown that she had knowledge of the 
particular defect which caused the ground to 
break off under her feet and precipitate her into 
the washout. Had she stepped over into the hole 
without the dirt giving way, a different question 
would be presented. Under the facts as shown· by 
the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude 
that the appellant was guilty of contributory neg-
ligence, as a matter of law, but the question is one 
for the jury. 
"The judgment will he reversed, and the cause 
remanded, with direction to the superior court to 
grant a new trial." 
Somewhat similar in principle is the case of City of 
Guthrie v. Swan, 5 Okl. 779, 51 Pac. 562, 564. The plain-
tiff there had judgment. Defendant appealed and as-
serted that plaintiff's evidence showed her to be guilty of 
contributory negligence as a matter of law. The court, 
in discussing this particular proposition, stated as follows 
concerning the laws as applied to the facts wherein a per-
son knows of a dangerous condition in a public street 
and sidewalk : 
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"The second proposition of the plaintiff in 
error is that the testimony of the plaintiff show~ 
that she was guilty of contributory negligence, and 
that the court should have sustained the demurrer 
to the plaintiff's evidence. Testimony was adduced 
to show that as the plaintiff approached First 
street the sidewalk was torn up and piled in sec-
tions; that there were no red lights at the point 
of injury on First street; that there was no railing 
built there as a preventive against danger, and 
that when she came to First street she saw that 
it was graded; that it was dark, cloudy, 'particu-
larly dark'; that she stepped down slowly and 
carefully; thought she was stepping down a foot, 
and that when she struck the ground it must haw' 
·been two or three feet; that she did not obseJTf' 
that the sidewalk had been torn up until she got 
to the place where it was taken up; that she could 
not see it before; that when she discovered it~ 
condition she went immediately into the road, 
where she thought it was smooth, and walk~d 
along there; that she traveled on the south side of 
the sidewalk, on the street, in coming up to the 
point where she was injured; that she knew the 
street was not traveled on the north side as much 
as on the south side; that the ground was higher 
and sloped up higher on the north than on the 
south side; and that when she !'ltep:ped down into 
the dark place it was a great deai further than she 
expected, and the injury followed; that she was 
on her way home from a chureh meeting when 
the injury complained of occurred; that she had 
no knowledge that any cut had been made across 
there at the time she started from the church to go 
hmne, and that she had not bern along there after 
the cut wa:s made. These circumstances, adduced 
in evidence, were such as that it wa~ the duty of 
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the court to subrnit them to the jury for determina-
tion as to whether or not, under proper instruc-
tions, the plaintiff was guilty of negligence. The 
same question was submitted for the consideration 
of this court upon the fonner trial of this case, 
and there passed upon, and similar conditions 
have been uniformly submitted to the jury upon 
the trial of like cases in the territory with the 
approval of this court. The sufficiency of the high-
way is ahnost always a rnere question of fact to be 
detern1ined by the jury upon the evidence of its 
actual condition. Draper v. Town of Ironton, 42 
Wis. 696. 
'"And, in the third place, the plaintiff in error 
objects espeeially to the eighth instruction given 
to the jury by the court as a misdirection of the 
law applied to the facts in this case. The instruc-
tion directed the jury that the plaintiff had a 
right to presume that the sidewalk was reasonably 
safe, but if, in passing upon it, she saw that there 
was an appearance of danger,~ then she had no 
right to proceed further upon the presumption 
that the walk was in a safe condition, but that the 
law required her, after she had noticed the dan-
ger, to use care commtnsurate with such apparent 
danger, and, if she failed to so act, and received 
the injury, she could not .recover; but that if, after 
she received the notice of the danger, she wa:; 
then in the exercise of due care, and under the 
belief that she had found a safe place to travel, 
she attempted to pass along the street, and in 
such attempt received an injury, which could not 
have been avoided by the use of a degree of care 
apparently sufficient to avoid the danger, then 
she might reco;ver for the injuries sustained, if 
caused by the negligence of the city. The jury 
could not have bet-n misled by this instruction, 
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for the la~v, which requires that the plaintiff 
rnust have been in the exercise of due care, and 
that care should be used commensurate with the 
apparent danger in order to enable the plaintiff 
to avoid the danger, and that if she was not in 
the exermse of such degree of care she could not 
recover, was such as has been approved in thi~ 
court in similar ~ases, and we believe to be cor-
rect." 
See also City of Guthrie v. Swan, 3 Old. 116, 41 Pac. 
84 for an earlier appeal of 1he same case. See also Shan-
draw et ux. v. City of Tacom '"t, 188 Wash. 389, 62 P. 2d 
1090. 
An early Nebraska case which appellant submits 
establishes the la:w as applicable to appellant's ca:se i::. 
Village of Ponca v. Crawford, 23 Nebr. 662, 37 N.W. 609, 
610, 8 Am. St. Rep. 144. Plaintiff there was walking along 
the village streets, camP to a break in the sidewalk which 
necessitated him lowering himself down approximately 
three feet. He was attempting to traverse t.he break when 
he fell over a sawhorse and suffered the injuries necessi-
tating the legal action. The village claimed that plaintiff 
was contributorily negligent a'S a matter of law. The Su-
preme Court of Nebraska in disposing of this contention 
stated as follows: 
"* * * Whether a person of ordinary care and 
prudence, of the knowledge of, and acquaintanc~· 
with, the streets and sidewalks of a village,- or 
the want of either-which the plaintiff was shmrr. 
to have possessed, would have turned hack anJ 
abandoned his purpose in proceeding along the 
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street, on ascertaining that there was an apparent 
break in the sidewalk, or would have continued 
his endeavor to proceed, i~ a question of fact for 
the jury, proper for their consideration and de-
termination under instructions." 
As appears from the quoted language, the Nebraska 
Court had exactly the situation now presented to our 
Utah Court, and appellant submits that the principles 
applied by the Nebraska Supreme Court should be ap-
plied by this Court. 
~\. later Nebraska case set forth the principle that 
the municipal corporation has a duty to keep the streets 
and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel 
by the public; that there is no duty on the part of a 
citizen to abandon the use of the streets when he dis-
covers that they are in an unsafe condition. The only 
effect such a discovery has is to place upon such a citizen 
the duty of exercising extra caution in crossing over or 
using the public sidewalks and streets. Pilnches v. Village 
of Dickens) 127 Nebr. 239, 254 N.W. 877. 
The Mis·souri Court of Appeals applied what has 
become the principles adopted by the A.L.I. Restatement 
of the Law of Torts in the case of Francis v. City of West 
Plains} 203 Mo. App. 249, 216 S.W. 808. There, as in the 
present case, a person in the darkness while attempting 
to use a highway under construction, had fallen into a 
hole and suffered a very severe injury. The Missouri 
Court of Appeals stated the principles applicable in the 
following language : 
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"* * * A person has a right to use a sidewalk 
which he knows is dangerous if he in such know-
ledge uses it with care to himself. It is not con-
ributory negligence as a n1atter of law, unless 
the defect is so glaringly dangerous that no pru-
dent person would attempt to pass over it. Loftes 
v. Kansas City, 156 M.:o. App. 683, 137 S.W. 993; 
Graney v. City of St. Louis, 141 Mo. 180, 42 S.\Y. 
941." 
In the Francis case the Supreme Court of Missouri 
held that the question of whether or not the injured 
plaintiff's conduct was :r;>roper was a question for the jury. 
A large number of cases have applied principles 
that are set forth in the Restatement. Among such cases 
are City of Bloomington v. Rogers, 9 Ind. App. 230, 36 
N.E. 439, 13 Ind. App. 121, 41 N.E. 395; Blessington v. 
City of Boston, 153 Mass. 409, 26 N.E. 1113; City of Su..-
perior v. Olt, 239 Fed. 100. 
Appellant submits that the application of the reason-
able man's standard to appellant's conduct is required 
if appellant is accorded his cons'titutional rights. Rele ... 
vant to the jury's consideration are the following facts: 
( 1) The trench was relatively narrow and 
easily stepped across and straddled by appellant. 
'(2) Appellant was accompanied by his wifP 
and there was no way of entering his home from 
the street except by walking either to Washington 
Avenue or back down to Grant Avenue. 
(3) The appearance of the asphalt surface 
of the highway around the trench bearing on 
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whether or not it could safely bear weight and 
provide an adequate footing. 
( 4) The fact that appellant had chosen his 
way of getting hon1e prior to the time that he be-
came fully aware of the nature of the trench which 
barred access to his home. As is stated in one of 
the cited cases, it w·ould be unnatural for him to 
abandon his chosen route unless confronted with 
an extren1e hazard which made injury very likely. 
{ 5) The jury could also consider the fact 
that the neighbors habitually crossed back and 
forth over the trench, both in the daytime. and at 
night, and that they apparently were of the op~n­
ion that it could be safely stepped acro'ss to gain 
access to their homes. 
(6) The convenience of merely stepping 
across a two foot trench as compared to walking 
a full block late at night in order to gain access 
to one's home. 
Each one of the considerations set forth in the pre-
ceding paragraphs necessitate a careful weighing of 
facts and the choosing of alternative courses of conduct. 
By the very nature of the problem the court usurped the 
function of the jury in solving these problems and dis-
missing appellant's cause. 
The appellant successfully stepped across the trench 
and it is only when an unexpected and undiscoverabl~ 
event occurs that any injury re'Sults to him, that event 
being the caving of the bank under appellant's foot caus-
ing his fall into the trench. 
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The duty upon the respondents to provide a reason-
ably safe means of crO'ssing from the street onto the side-
walk, especially at the point where the sidewalk on Kiesel 
Avenue crosses 18th Street would seem to be beyond 
any drspute. Had a bridge or walkway been provided by 
respondents, properly lighted, appellant would not have 
been required to expose himself to the danger of crossing 
an open trench and the injuries which he received would 
not have been incurred. 
There is nothing about appellant's conduct which 
would be extraordinary or would indicate a la:ck of care 
for hi's oiWil safety. The jury could well have found on 
the basis of appellant's opening statement that appellant 
was exercising care for his own safety. There is no evi-
dence from which they would be impelled to find that 
he was guilty of negligence. Appellant respectfully 
submits that the trial court e·rred in concluding that ap-
pellant was contributorily negligent as matter of law 
and dismissing his cause with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respe·ctfully submits that this Court should 
reverse the order and judgment of the· trial court, grant-
ing appellant a new trial on the merits of his cause and 
preserving to him his constitutional right of trial by jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
DWIGHT L. KING, 
Counsel for Plaintiff and 
Appellant 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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